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AMICI CURIAE IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: How
FRIENDLY ARE THEY?
The United States Courts of Appeals should consider certain
changes to current rules and practices in order to limit undesirable
amicus curiae participation. Although amicus briefs do not pose an
overwhelming burden on these courts, these briefs are of limited
value in a majority of federal appellate cases and the potential for
abusive overuse of the amicus device could have damaging effects.
Increased publication of reasoned decisions denying motions for
leave to file an amicus brief will deter improper filings. Additionally,
the funding and preparation of amicus briefs by parties to a case
should be prohibited in federal courts of appeals.'
The role of an amicus curiae was accepted in ancient Roman
times, under English law, and is now also accepted in the United
States Supreme Court.2 Times have changed, however, in the usages
of the amicus curiae device, the judicial workload, and the amount of
information available. Considering these changes along with the
unique context and purpose of the federal appellate courts, it is neces-
sary to rethink the current amicus practice. This process has begun to
take place in the courts. A line of Seventh Circuit opinions rejecting
proposed amicus submissions have taken the position that participa-
tion should be limited. These decisions have attempted to clarify
when an amicus brief is appropriate.3 Proponents of broader amicus
practice have responded.4
I This Note specifically addresses amicus curiae participation in the federal courts of ap-
peals. It does not address or challenge Supreme Court policy or practice regarding amici. The
Note intends to point out material differences in characteristics between these courts which
justify a different approach in the courts of appeals.
2 Nancy Bage Sorenson, Comment, The Ethical Implications of Amicus Briefs: A Pro-
posal for Reforming Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1219, 1224-25 (1999) (discussing amicus practice in the Texas appellate courts and proposing
changes to rules).
3 See Voices for Choices v. 11. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat'l Org. for
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The first section of this Note provides background information
relevant to the issue. It begins by summarizing current law regarding
amicus submissions, namely Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29
and recent federal appeals court cases that have taken up this issue.
Next is a discussion of current amicus practice in the federal courts of
appeals with some history and generalities about the amicus device to
provide context. The section ends with a brief discussion of amicus
participation in the United States Supreme Court for comparative
purposes.
The second section analyzes whether or not anicus participation in
the federal courts of appeals should be restricted. This section of the
Note begins with a discussion of the burden that these briefs place on
the courts of appeals. Some empirical research attempts to measure
and contextualize this burden. After this discussion, this Note con-
siders the value that amicus participation offers to the courts of ap-
peals. The unique characteristics of the federal appellate system are
juxtaposed with amicus usage and purposes to determine whether
broad amicus participation in the courts of appeals is beneficial to the
system. Lastly, this section discusses some of the problems that
broad amicus participation causes in the courts of appeals, focusing
on the rights of parties, possibilities of inequitable results, and in-
creased litigation costs.
The third and final section of this Note deals with possible meth-
ods of limiting amicus participation or otherwise alleviating problems
identified in the previous section. It begins by considering the fac-
tored approach applied by the Seventh Circuit and identifying prob-
lems that may be associated with such an approach. Next, it proposes
two other possible solutions. The first deals with financing, prepara-
tion, and solicitation of amici by parties to a case. The second deals
with the publication of opinions denying amici leave to file.
I. BACKGROUND: CURRENT LAW AND AMICUS PRACTICE
Federal appeals court jurisprudence discussing the parameters of
amicus participation is fairly sparse, but there are some recent deci-
sions on the subject that express differing viewpoints. This section
discusses these cases along with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
Women v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir.
1997).
4 See Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002), affd, 299
F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an Amicus?,
1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 279 (1999) (arguing against a restrictive approach to amicus partici-
pation).
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29 and frames the issue. It also provides background on amicus prac-
tice, with a focus on the federal courts of appeals. Supreme Court
practice is also discussed briefly.
A. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 and Relevant Case Law
Amicus participation in the federal courts of appeals is a privilege
within "the sound discretion of the courts."5 Although this standard
does not provide clear guidelines, it is dependent "upon a finding that
the proffered information of amicus is timely, useful, or otherwise
necessary to the administration of justice.",6 More specifically, Fed-
eral Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, as amended in 1998, governs
amicus curiae participation. The Seventh and Third Circuits have
issued opinions indicating their approach to amicus participation in
light of the 1998 amendments to Rule 29. Most circuits, however, are
silent on the issue.
Under Rule 29(a), the United States, its officers and agencies, and
other state entities may file an amicus brief without party consent or
leave of the court.7 Private parties who cannot file an amicus brief as
of right have two options. First, a potential amicus can file its brief if
all parties have consented to the filing.8 If the parties do not consent,
the amicus may file a brief only by leave of the court.9 In order to get
leave of the court, an amicus must file a motion for leave to file, ac-
companied by the proposed brief, and stating "(1) [its] interest; and
(2) the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters
asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case."' 0 From this sec-
tion, the inferred requirements for amicus participation are an interest,
desirability, and relevance. The remainder of Rule 29 deals with the
form of the brief and other procedural requirements." The focus of
this Note will be on motions to file an amicus curiae brief requiring
leave of the court and when leave is proper. 
2
5 United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Northern Sec.
Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903)).
6 Id.
7 FED. R. App. P. 29(a) ("The United States or its officer or agency, or a State, Territory,
Commonwealth, or the District of Columbia may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent
of the parties or leave of court.").
8 FED. R. APP. P. 29(a).
9 Id.
10 FED. R. App. P. 29(b)(1)-(2).
11 FED. R. App. P. 29(c)-(g).
12 As already discussed, under Rule 29 an amicus will only need leave of the court if it is a
private individual or organization and has not obtained the consent of all parties to the case.
Because statistics regarding amicus participation are not readily available, it is not clear how
often amici gain access through leave of the court. This information is important because if
motions for leave to file an amicus brief under Rule 29(b) are very rare, the debate about how
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Although Rule 29 sets out some basic guidelines for when the
court should grant leave to file an amicus brief, it is fairly open-
ended.' 3  The general practice in the federal courts of appeals is to
grant leave to file an amicus brief in most situations. 14 However, this
open-door policy has been challenged of late. Interpretation of Rule
29 and the question of when an appeals court should allow amicus
participation has become an issue in some recent cases.
In Voices for Choices v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., a Seventh Cir-
cuit decision, Judge Posner denied a motion for leave to file an
amicus brief. He noted that the decision "to allow the filing of an
amicus curiae brief is a matter of 'judicial grace." ' 15  Further, he
noted that the court would deny permission to file amicus briefs that
did not add anything to a party's brief.' 6 Judge Posner cited several
reasons for limiting amicus participation:
The reasons for the policy are several: judges have heavy
caseloads and therefore need to minimize extraneous reading;
amicus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be used to make
an end run around court-imposed limitations on the length of
parties' briefs; the time and other resources required for the
preparation and study of, and response to, amicus briefs drive
up the cost of litigation; and the filing of an amicus brief is
restrictive or open courts should be is not very significant. Statistics would be valuable in
assessing the importance of this issue. However, from some judicial opinions that raise this
issue, it can be inferred that a significant number of amici do attempt to gain access to a case by
filing a motion for leave to file. The line of Seventh Circuit opinions taking a restrictive ap-
proach towards amicus participation cite a need to reduce heavy workloads as a rationale. See
Voices for Choices v. ilL. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat'l Org. for
Women v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064
(7th Cir. 1997). It would be an illogical assertion that reducing amicus participation could aid a
workload problem if the court only had the ability to deny participation in a negligible number
of cases. Indeed, the fact that the court has taken the time to explain its rationale and approach
on these occasions suggests that it is an important issue at least to the Seventh Circuit. Addi-
tionally, by opposing a restrictive approach, the Third Circuit has indicated that is also believes
this is a significant issue. See Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir.
2002), affd, 299 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining negative effects which would result from a
restrictive approach). Arguments on both sides of this debate would be moot if amici rarely
needed leave of court to participate. Finally, parties may consent when they know courts are
very likely to allow participation anyway. Changes in court policy could affect consent filings
as well in this manner. Therefore, even without the statistics, this Note assumes that judicial
standards for leave to file an amicus brief are significant.
13 See, e.g., Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 132 ("The criterion of desirability set out in
Rule 29(b)(2) is open-ended .... ).
14 See MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE 181 (3d ed. 1999).
13 Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544 (quoting Nat'l Org.for Women, 223 F.3d at 616).
16 Id.
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often an attempt to inject interest group politics into the fed-
eral appeals process.17
For the above reasons, the court announced the criteria it would
apply in deciding whether to allow amicus participation. The court
would look at "whether the brief will assist the judges by presenting
ideas, arguments, theories, insights, facts, or data that are not to be
found in the parties' briefs."' 8  According to this standard, amicus
participation is more likely to be granted when a party to the case is
inadequately represented, the potential amicus has "a direct interest in
another case that may be materially affected by a decision in [the cur-
rent case]," or the potential amicus has a unique perspective or spe-
cific information to assist the court.' 9
Voices for Choices was the third of a series of Seventh Circuit de-
cisions which took a restrictive approach toward amicus participation
and set out specific criteria to be applied in determining whether to
grant leave to file an amicus brief.20 Although other circuit courts
have not yet explicitly applied the Seventh Circuit approach in con-
sidering a motion for leave to file an amicus brief, some district courts
have cited one of the Seventh Circuit cases while deciding whether to
allow amicus participation.2'
17 Id.
1s Id. at 545.
'9 Id.
20 See Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying
motion to file an amicus brief for the same reasons and applying the same criteria as Voices for
Choices); Ryan v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the same criteria to
limit amicus participation because amicus briefs are mostly repetitive).
21 See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 246 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Ryan v.
CFTC extensively in order to both deny and allow participation by various amici); Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying ACLU motion for leave to file an
amicus brief and stating "the limitations on amicus filings outlined by the Seventh Circuit in
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler ... are applicable here."); Long v. Coast Re-
sorts, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1178 (D. Nev. 1999) (citing Ryan v. CFTC in an order denying a
motion for leave to file an amicus brief); United States v. Boeing Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900-
01 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (citing Ryan v. CFTC while granting leave to participate as amicus);
United Stationers v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Judge
Posner's "insightful opinion on amicus curiae briefs" in Ryan v. CFTC in explaining the court's
denial for leave to file). But see, United States v. Alkaabi, 223 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592 (D.N.J.
2002) (citing Neonatology Associates v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which advocates an
open policy towards amicus submission, in an opinion granting leave to file an amicus brief).
District courts are not governed by FED. R. APP. P. 29 and have different reasons for allowing or
disallowing amici. The support of Judge Posner's position in some of these opinions may be
due to the fact that amici are not as appropriate in trial courts. See Liberty Lincoln Mercury v.
Ford Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 82 (D.N.J. 1993) (suggesting that "[alt the trial level,
where issues of fact as well as law predominate, the aid of amicus curiae may be less appropri-
ate than at the appellate level where such participation has become standard procedure") (quot-
ing Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D.N.J. 1985)). These opinions, however, are
valuable in that they are expressions of judicial approval of the Seventh Circuit approach.
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This approach, however, is not without opponents. A recent Third
Circuit opinion granting a motion for leave to file an amicus brief
22states that a broad reading of Rule 29 is proper. The opinion cited
"a small body of judicial opinions that look with disfavor on motions
for leave to file amicus briefs," including two of the Seventh Circuit
opinions, and clearly implied that those were not the law of the Third
Circuit.23  The court expressed concerns that a restrictive approach
towards amicus participation would deprive the court of a valuable
resource because judges would not be able to gage the relevance of an
amicus brief at an early stage, and would create a perception of view-
point discrimination by selective denials of participation. 24 Addition-
ally, the opinion expressed doubt as to whether denying amicus par-
ticipation would have any effect on the court's workload.25
While these circuits are the only two to squarely address standards
for allowing amicus participation under Rule 29, other circuit courts
have skirted the edge of this issue and offered some insight into their
opinions on amicus participation. In an Eleventh Circuit opinion de-
nying attorney fees for time spent on an amicus brief, the court cited
Voices for Choices for the proposition that amicus briefs are often
solicited by party attorneys as a way to avoid page limitations on their
briefs.26 The court indicated its opinion of this practice, stating: "To
pay a party for such work would encourage the practice, which we are
loathe to do.",27 In a pair of cases in the District of Columbia Circuit,
although an amicus brief was validly before the court, the majority
and the dissent expressed opposite views about how the court may use
amicus briefs.28 These cases call into question the proper role of
22 Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2002).
23 See id. at 130 (citing National Organization for Women and Ryan as examples of the
restrictive approach before expressing the view that an open approach is better).
24 Id. at 132-33.
25 Id. at 133. See also Munford, supra note 4, at 279-284 (arguing against Chief Judge
Posner's restrictive approach in Ryan and for freely granting leave to file amicus briefs accord-
ing to Rule 29). The debate over the importance of amicus briefs is not entirely novel in the
Third Circuit. In 1983, the court did not allow a group of law professors to file an amicus brief.
In a cursory opinion, the court reasoned that the professors had no interest in the subject matter
and the parties would adequately present the issues. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists v. Thomburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983). In a more elaborate dissent, Judge
Higginbotham stressed the importance of amicus participation and the Supreme Court's open
policy towards granting leave to amici. He believed that the proposed brief could supply the
court with valuable insight. Id. at 645-47 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
26 Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (1 th Cir. 2003).
27 Id.
28 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff'd, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Although these cases do not deal directly with the
standards by which a court will deny or grant leave to file an amicus brief, they do indicate
differing opinions as to the importance and scope of amici. Judge Sentelle's dissents in both of
these cases indicate a belief in the importance of amici in appellate adjudication, while the
[Vol. 55:3
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amici in the federal courts of appeals and could indicate that other
courts may join the debate in the future.
B. Current Amicus Practice in the Courts of Appeals
"Amicus curiae" is Latin for friend of the court. At common law,
this was a true definition of the role of an amicus curiae.29  The
amicus was not a person with an adversary interest in the proceeding;
rather, he served to aid the court. He was a servant of the court who
"acts for no one, but simply seeks to give information to the court.',30
This traditional description of the amicus curiae, although adhered to
through most of the twentieth century, has not been accurate in the
United States for a long time. 3' In the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, amici did not identify themselves with a group. By the 1930's,
however, organizations were commonly sponsoring the briefs.32 By
the 1960's, in his article about the changing role of the amicus brief,
Samuel Krislov wrote: "The amicus is no longer a neutral, amorphous
embodiment of justice, but an active participant in the interest group
struggle.,
33
An amicus brief is ordinarily limited in what it can do on appeal.
It will not be permitted to bring up new issues on appeal, request re-
lief not requested by the parties, or present new evidence on appeal.34
Generally, amicus briefs will argue the cause by pointing out relevant
points of law and facts.35 Amici "address the implications of a par-
majority's view might suggest a view that amici have a less prominent and thus less important
role.
29 See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE
L.J. 694, 694-99 (1962) (explaining the history and development of the amicus curiae from
English common law to the 20th century United States). See also Note, Amici Curiae, 34
HARV. L. REv. 773, 773-74 (1920) ("An amicus curiae cannot perform any act on behalf of a
party; his suggestions are simply for the purpose of supplementing the information of the court.
He represents no one and obviously no one is bound by what he does.").
30 Krislov, supra note 29, at 697 (quoting Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70, 72 (1859)).
31 Some definitions of amicus curiae still refer to the traditional role. See, e.g., 4 Am. JUR.
2D Amicus Curiae § 1 (2003) (amicus curiae "refers to persons, whether attorneys or laypersons,
who interpose in a judicial proceeding to assist the court by giving information, or otherwise, or
who conduct an investigation or other proceeding on request, or by court appointment").
32 Krislov, supra note 29, at 703.
33 Id.
34 4. AM. JUR. 2D Amicus Curiae § 8 (2003). See also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379
(D.C. Cir. 2001), aftid, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (quoting Resident Council of Allen Parkway Vill.
v. HUD, 980 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993) (amicus constrained "by the rule that [it] generally
cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been presented by the
parties to the appeal")).
35 The difference between making an argument and raising an issue is not always clear.
The dialogue between the majority and dissent in Eldred is a good example of this. Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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ticular rule... in a broader context than the ... party" and point out
effects that will reach beyond the parties. 36 They can also make de-
tailed arguments that page limitations would not support.37 The court
of appeals may even allow amicus participation in oral argument.38
Federal appellate courts have cited amicus briefs for a variety of
purposes. For example, the Third Circuit cited an amicus brief exten-
sively in recounting the facts of a case where the brief was submitted
by an individual who was involved in every stage of a contract dis-
pute at issue but was not a party. 39 On other occasions, the court has
recognized the argument of an amicus pointing out another body of
law,40 pointing out third party effects of a particular judicial deci-
41 42sion, arguing for a particular statutory interpretation, or providing
background information relevant to the dispute.43
Amici are often not only interested third parties, but extensions of
the parties themselves. Parties often solicit amicus support as another
weapon in the adversarial struggle." Rule 29 does not ignore this
role since an amicus brief must be filed "no later than 7 days after the
principal brief of the party being supported is filed" and must indicate
which party is supported by the brief.45 In this sense, the briefs can be
repetitive extensions to a party's arguments.46
36 TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 14, at 181.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 New Eng. Patriots Football Club v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1198-1200 (3d Cir.
1979) (citing brief by football coach in a dispute over his services).
40 See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Franklin, 314 F.3d 79, 98 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Affording
due deference to the St. Regis Tribe, I would decline to question the representation of its clerk,
reiterated in the Tribe's amicus curiae brief, that under the law or custom of the St. Regis Tribe,
Thompson remains a member notwithstanding her purported resignation letter.").
41 See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Networks v. Evans, 299 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (quoting an amicus brief by Georgia Shrimp Association and Boone Seafood which noted
that the majority approach put domestic shrimpers at a competitive disadvantage).
42 See, e.g., In re Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11 th Cir. 2002) (quoting an amicus brief
by the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys arguing legislative intent based
on placement of a modifier in statutory text).
43 See, e.g., Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Venemai, 313 F.3d 1094, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002)
(referencing an amicus brief submitted by the Montana Attorney General providing statistical
data demonstrating that the challenged rule was publicly supported).
44 See Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11 th Cir. 2003) (addressing the amount of
time plaintiffs lead counsel spent requesting amici from various organizations); Voices for
Choices v. fI1. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (claiming that parties often
solicit amicus briefs in order to circumvent court-imposed limitations on the length of parties'
briefs).
45 FED. R. App. P. 29(e).
46 See Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544 (expressing belief that briefs are often solicited
by parties to "make an end run around court-imposed limitations on the length of parties'
briefs"). See also Glassroth, 347 F.3d at 919 ("nor are we shocked that counsel for a party
would have a hand in writing an amicus brief'); Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293
F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that some amicus briefs make "little if any contri-
bution").
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C. Amicus Practice in the Supreme Court
Amicus curiae participation is most prominent in the Supreme
Court. Supreme Court Rule 37 governs participation and is similar in
some respects to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.47 In prac-
tice, the Court grants almost all motions for leave to file an amicus
brief.48 The Supreme Court's policy "is to allow essentially unlimited
amicus participation." 49 There are few signs that this open-door pol-
icy will change. 50 In recent years, at least one amicus brief has been
filed in 85% of Supreme Court cases.5' Amicus briefs appear to be
relied on by the Court as they are cited quite frequently. 2
Amicus curiae briefs have played a prominent role in Supreme
Court jurisprudence. There are many examples of amicus effects on
significant Supreme Court decisions. The NAACP, as amicus curiae,
suggested overturning Plessy v. Ferguson in 1941 in the case of Hen-
derson v. United States.53 In Sweatt v. Painter, the law school segre-
gation case prior to Brown v. Board of Education, the Court relied on
a brief from a group of law professors arguing that segregated legal
education violated the Fourteenth Amendment.54  And it was the
ACLU in an amicus brief, and not the appellants, who suggested
overruling Wolf v. Colorado in Mapp v. Ohio.55 Amicus briefs con-
tinue to be present in large numbers in socially important Supreme
Court decisions. The Court referenced the arguments of the many
amici in Roe v. Wade.56 Fifty-eight amicus briefs were filed in Bakke
57v. Regents of the University of California. Amici also played an
47 Sup. CT. R. 37.
48 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 762 (2000).
49 Id. at 764 (quoting Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Amici Curiae before the
Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990)).
5o But see SUP. CT. R. 37(6) (requiring disclosure of relationships between amici and par-
ties, including whether or not a party counsel participated in writing the brief, possibly suggest-
ing concern about misuse of amicus briefs). See also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. l, 35-36
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that, in a case in which 14 amicus briefs were submitted
all in support of one party, the Court allowed organized self-interest groups to override its
responsibility to the pursuit of truth).
5' Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 744.
52 Id. at 757.
13 Krislov, supra note 29, at 712 (citing Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, Henderson
v. United States, 314 U.S. 625 (1941)).
' Jonathan L. Entin, Sweatt v. Painter and Education Law, 5 REV. LITIG. 3, 57 (1986)
(explaining that the Court's analysis, in finding Texas's separate law school unconstitutional,
"bore the unmistakable imprint of the Law Teachers' amicus brief").
55 Krislov, supra note 29, at 712 (referencing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,675 n.5 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
56 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (referring to amici arguments throughout the
opinion).
57 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:3
important role in the recent University of Michigan affirmative action
cases.
58
Several attempts have been made to empirically study the effects
of amicus briefs on Supreme Court decisions. 59 For example, a recent
study analyzed 6,000 Supreme Court decisions from 1946-1995 and
made observations on success rates for certain common amicus filers
and certain patterns of participation. 6° Another study analyzed the
Court's 1982 term and concluded that amicus briefs positively influ-61
ence the decision to grant certiorari.
Most of the empirical analysis regarding amicus curiae participa-
tion has focused on the Supreme Court.62 Unfortunately, support of
broad amicus participation in the courts of appeals is sometimes
based on what has occurred in the Supreme Court without looking
closely at what is occurring specifically in the courts of appeals.63 It
is harder to compile empirical data from the thousands of appeals
cases, and some information is not easily accessible. The analysis
below, however, attempts to create a basic picture of what is occur-
ring in the courts of appeals. The Supreme Court experience and the
scholarship surrounding it is useful for context and comparison. But
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 804 (1990).
58 See Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You've Got To Have Friends: Lessons Learned
from The Role of Amici in The University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503 (2004) (dis-
cussing the ways that amicus briefs aided the Supreme Court's decision making process in these
two cases). This article cites Judge Posner, among others, as a critic of amicus overuse. Id. at
503-04.
59 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 767-74 (summarizing some of the more influ-
ential studies of the effects of amici on Supreme Court outcomes).
60 Id. at 829 (finding the Solicitor General was the most successful amicus, and the
ACLU, AFL-CIO, and States had above-average success; finding also that when one or two
briefs supported one side and none supported the other, the supported side might be more likely
to be successful, although larger disparities did not lead to increased success rates).
61 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1109, 1122 (1988) (finding that "[w]ithout
question ... interested parties can have a significant and positive impact on the Court's agenda
by participating as amici curiae prior to the Court's decision on certiorari or jurisdiction"). See
also Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54
OKLA. L. REv. 727, 768 (2001) (finding a "positive association between the granting of review
and the filing of... an anici brief in favor of review").
62 Some studies have focused on state level amicus curiae participation. See, e.g., Sylvia
H. Wabolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe of Florida Courts?, 32
STETSON L. REv. 269 (2003) (exploring the use and effects of amicus briefs in Florida and
considering possible changes in Florida amicus practice).
63 See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644,
645-47 (3d Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing the Supreme Court's open policy
towards amicus participation and participation by law professors as amici in some influential
Supreme Court decisions such as Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, Sweatt v.
Painter, and Roe v. Wade); Munford, supra note 4, at 280-82 (citing Supreme Court cases as
examples of useful amicus briefs in argument against Judge Posner's position).
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as the analysis below indicates, there are important distinctions that
justify a different approach to appellate amicus practice.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR RESTRICTING AMICuS PARTICIPATION IN THE
FEDERAL APPEALS COURTS
The arguments against broad amicus participation raise concerns
about workload problems, increased litigation costs, improper use of
the device by parties, and the improper use of courts of appeals to
further interest group politics.64 Proponents see a value in amicus
65participation that outweighs these concerns. These arguments are
analyzed below in three sections discussing the burden of, the value
of, and the harm caused by a broad policy of allowing amicus partici-
pation.66
A. The Burden of Amicus Participation
In National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, Judge Posner
argued that the court should be more restrictive towards amicus sub-
missions because "judges have heavy caseloads.., and [therefore]
wish to minimize extraneous reading." 67 It is no secret that the courts
of appeals have heavy workloads, but to what extent amicus briefs
contribute to the problem is the question.
A detailed study of federal appellate amicus practice for 2002
sheds some light on the extent of any burden resulting from amicus
submissions. The data indicates the cases in which at least one
amicus appeared, whether or not the amicus was mentioned in the text
of the opinion, whether or not the amicus brief was quoted, how many
briefs were filed, and who the amici were.68 During 2002, at least one
64 See Voices for Choices v. 111. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003).
65 See Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128, 130-32 (3d Cir. 2002) (dis-
cussing reasons for a broad reading of Rule 29).
66 The Supreme Court has already considered much of this rationale and rejected it as
grounds for restricting amicus participation. The 1949 amendment to the Supreme Court rule
governing amicus participation had the effect of cutting participation by more than half by 1951.
See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of Rules Govern-
ing Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 35, 37 (1983) (participation dropped from
31.6% of cases in 1949 to 13.6% in 1951). According to O'Connor and Epstein, "[tihe Justices
found many of the briefs had only limited value, and thus were unnecessary additions to the
paperwork involved in their already spiraling caseload." Id. at 35. By the mid 1950s, however,
after negative comments by Justices Frankfurter and Black, as well as scholarly criticism of the
restrictive rule, amicus participation was on the rise again. Id at 38-39. The increasing caseload
in the 1970s and 1980s led O'Connor and Epstein to hypothesize that the Court would deny
more motions for leave to file as amicus. Id. at 39-40. Denials were rare despite the caseload
problems, leading to the conclusion that the Court viewed "the utility of amicus briefs as out-
weighing their impact on its already overcrowded docket." Id. at 41,43.
67 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir. 2000).
68 The data referred to consists of Westlaw reported cases for 2002. The numbers were ar-
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amicus participated in 413 reported federal appeals court cases.69
There were a total of 635 briefs submitted in these 413 cases.
70  The
majority of these cases only had one brief, but the most briefs submit-
ted in one case was eleven. Considering that these cases are dispersed
over thirteen courts of appeals (twelve regional circuits and the Fed-
eral Circuit) composed of a total of 179 authorized regular judges
which usually sit in panels of only three judges, each judge probably
encounters only a small number of amicus briefs per year.
71 If each
brief is read three times (by three judges on a panel), then a total of
1905 briefs must be read. Dividing this number by 179 active judges,
each judge read an average of 10.64 briefs in 2002.72 The length of
an amicus brief is limited to half the length of a party's principal
brief, and a response is also allowed by Rule 29. Based on this, it
does not seem that amicus briefs pose a very large burden on the
courts of appeals.
rived at by searching all federal court of appeals cases with the word amicus or amici in the area
of the opinion where participants (usually just the lawyers) are indicated. The search terms
were: IAT(AMICUS AMICI) & DA(AFT 12/31/2001 & BEF 1/1/2003)1. To find cases where
an amicus brief was referred to in the text of the opinion, I & OP(AMICUS AMICI)) was added
to the above search. The part of the opinion with the word amicus or amici indicated whether or
not it was a quotation. Amici were usually named and separated by the briefs onto which they
signed. It was not always clear who the amicus was or how many briefs were submitted. Some-
times the court listed a lawyer but did not indicate if he or she was representing a group or
organization as an amicus. Despite this imprecision, the data provides a rough but useful con-
trast to empirical studies that have been conducted regarding amicus participation in the Su-
preme Court.
69 See infra Figure 1 (presenting data on 2002 amicus participation in Westlaw reported
cases).
70 id-
71 See TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 14, at 240, 243, 244-50 (explaining the organization of
the federal appeals courts).
72 This number will only be an approximation. If the court is sitting en banc, then many
more judges will have to read the amicus brief. Also, the calculation does not account for senior
judges who may read briefs on occasion.
73 FED. R. APP. P. 29(d).
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2002 Westlaw Reported Courts of
Appeals Cases
Cases with Amicus Participation 413
Total Number of Briefs Submitted 635
Average Briefs Per Case with Amicus Participa-
tion 1.54
Opinions Referencing Amicus 152
Percentage Referencing Amicus 36.90%
Opinions Quoting Amicus 45
Percentage Quoting Amicus 10.90%
Cases with One Brief 291
Percentage with One Brief 70.60%
Cases with Two Briefs 68
Cases with More Than Two Briefs 53
Cases with Five or More Briefs 12
Cases with Eight or More Briefs 3
Figure 1.
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Figure 2.
Certainly, it appears as if amicus briefs are a far greater burden on
the Supreme Court. As indicated before, a single Supreme Court case
might draw over 50 amicus briefs and numerous submissions are not
uncommon.74 The vast majority of Supreme Court cases involve
74 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 57, at 804.
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amicus brief submissions.75 Additionally, the Supreme Court might
be faced with hundreds more amicus briefs while making decisions
76
on certiorari.
Amicus submissions to the courts of appeals are not increasing at a
rate that would cause a substantial burden in the near future either. In
1992, 363 Westlaw reported appeals court cases listed a participating
amicus compared to 413 for 2002. . This represents an increase of
14.6% over this ten year period. Over the same ten year period, total
appeals terminated by federal courts of appeals went from 44,373 in
1992 to 56,586 in 2002.78 This represents a 27.5% increase. Thus,
although the burden on the federal courts of appeals is increasing,
amicus submissions are actually becoming a smaller portion of that
burden.
75 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 751-56.
76 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 61, at 1116 (at least 159 (148 cases plus 11 where a
brief was submitted on both sides) were submitted for 1982 term).
77 See infra Figure 3 (depicting amicus appearances in Weslaw reported cases for the
years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002).
78 Federal Court Management Statistics - 2002 - Courts of Appeals - National Totals,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa200 2 .pl; id., available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-binlcmsa.pl.
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Amicus Appearances and References in US Court of
Appeals Cases**





E 250 M Appearances





2002 1997 1992 1987 1982
Year
WESTLAW Reported Cases
Year Appearances References Frequency
2002 416 155 0.37
1997 423 158 0.37
1992 363 130 0.36
1987 310 88 0.28
1982 268 89 0.33
**This data was compiled by searching for cases with the words "amicus" or
"amici" in the attorney portion of the opinion and then searching the texts of those
opinions for the words "amicus" or "amici".
Figure 3.
It is necessary to note that many appeals court decisions go unre-
ported. In the twelve month period ending September 30, 2002,
80.5% of 27,758 federal appeals court opinions or orders were unpub-
lished.79 All of the data discussed above was generated only from
reported cases. The numbers of amicus briefs that appear in unre-
ported cases is an unknown variable. However, it might be a logical
assumption that amicus briefs are most commonly submitted in cases
drawing the most attention which would be reported more frequently.
Even if the incidence of amicus participation in unreported cases was
the same as in reported cases, meaning the numbers discussed above
would increase by five times, it would still be a minor burden relative
to the Supreme Court, although definitely significant.
79 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2002 - U.S. Courts of Appeals - Types of
Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission
on Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2002, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/sO3sepO2.pdf [hereinafter Judicial Business, Types
of Opinions or Orders].
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Despite the relatively minor burden on appeals courts, one might
argue that the appeals courts' dockets are so heavily overloaded,
much more so than the Supreme Court, that it is more necessary to cut
workload wherever possible. A total of 27,758 appeals were termi-
nated on the merits in the twelve month period ending September 30,
2002.80 The 179 regular authorized judges participated in a total of
64,916 cases. This is an average of 362.7 cases each. This might
justify a different approach in the courts of appeals. The Supreme
Court does not hear near that many cases on the merits each year,
although they do deal with a much larger number of petitions for cer-
tiorari. Even if amicus briefs are only a relatively slight burden, it
might be a slight burden that the appeals courts cannot handle given
the caseload crisis.
82
B. The Value of Amicus Participation
It might make sense to alleviate even a very minor burden if it had
no value. Judge Posner clearly does not think amicus briefs are useful
to the court in many circumstances. He wrote: "The vast majority of
amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the
arguments made in the litigants' briefs, in effect merely extending the
length of the litigant's brief., 83 Although even Judge Posner's oppo-
nents would not deny that amicus briefs can sometimes be repetitive
and not of very much value, they see this as a minor negative associ-
ated with the generally valuable amicus curiae.84
The issue presented here is how often briefs are repetitive and dis-
regarded, and, on the other hand, how often they aid the court in com-
ing to a decision. One way to attempt to resolve this question is look-
80 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2002 - U.S. Courts of Appeals - Appeals
Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month
Period Ending September 30, 2002, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/s0 lsepO2.pdf.
81 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2002 - U.S. Courts of Appeals - Total
Case Participations in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on
Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2002, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/sO2sepO2.pdf.
82 Another issue that is addressed below is whether or not restricting participation through
requirements like Judge Posner suggests will actually provide more work, and thus increase the
burden of amicus briefs. See infra Part Il.A.
83 Ryan v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
94 See Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[I]t is
preferable to err on the side of granting leave. If an amicus brief that turns out to be unhelpful is
filed, the merits panel, after studying the case, will often be able to make that determination
without much trouble and can then simply disregard the amicus brief."); see also Munford,
supra note 4, at 284 ("Even some repetition should be tolerated on the ground it is easily disre-
garded. After all, sometimes the most important thing a friend can do is remind you to do what
is right.").
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ing at the frequency with which courts cite and quote amicus briefs.
This methodology was used by Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill
in their 2000 article studying the impact of amicus briefs on the Su-
preme Court.85 Their findings indicated that Supreme Court Justices
were referring to amicus briefs in their opinions (the study included
majorities, pluralities, concurrences, and dissents) with increasing
frequency during the time period of 1946-1995.86 In the period be-
tween 1986 and 1995, approximately 37% of Supreme Court deci-
sions where an amicus was present referred to an amicus in the text of
the opinion and approximately 15% actually quoted an amicus.87
According to the 2002 courts of appeals data, of the 413 cases in
which an amicus was present, the court referred to the amicus in 152.
This is equal to 37%. Forty-five, or 11%, of the cases quoted the
brief of an amicus. 88 This is very similar to the most recent numbers
reported by Kearney and Merrill for the Supreme Court and could
suggest that the federal courts of appeals rely on amicus briefs when
they are submitted just as much as the Supreme Court does. 89 Kear-
ney and Merrill, however, noted that Supreme Court citations were
increasing. 90 For the appeals courts, however, the incidence of court
references to amici has remained fairly steady, remaining in the 30%
range from 1982 to 2002.91 Although the Supreme Court numbers
may have increased to a greater rate, the courts of appeals numbers
have remained fairly steady and the courts do not mention the amicus
in nearly two-thirds of the cases in which an amicus is present.
85 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 757 ("The only publicly visible manifestation
of the impact of amici is the frequency with which their briefs are cited or quoted in opinions of
the Justices.").
6 Id.
87 Id. at 757-758 (stating "[t]he incidence of quotations could yield a truer approximation
of the extent to which the Court has actually relied on amicus arguments").
88 See supra Figure 1.
89 This method for determining reliance is relatively crude. A court may rely extensively
on an amicus brief without ever mentioning it. As discussed above, the Supreme Court analysis
in Sweatt v. Painter was influenced by an amicus brief. Entin, supra note 54, at 57. That deci-
sion, however, does not contain the word amicus or amici. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629(1950). On the other hand, a single mention of the amici may not indicate the extent of reliance.
See, e.g, Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 641 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting: "I am indebted to the
brief of amici American Public Health Association et al. for its lucid and forceful analysis of
this issue. Much of the discussion in the text is plagiarized from that brief. For ease of readabil-
ity, I dispense with further attribution."). Finally, a mention of the amici's brief may indicate
absolutely no reliance. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality, 309 F.3d 550
n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We decline to consider Amici's arguments regarding §246 of the Clean Air
Act."). Despite these imperfections with this methodology, it gives an objective general picture
of reliance and is useful in making comparisons with the Supreme Court.
90 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 757-58.
91 See supra Figure 3 (depicting number of appeals court cases with an amicus and the
number of those cases where the text of the opinion referred to an amicus using both LexisNexis
and Westlaw).
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Amicus briefs are less valuable to the courts of appeals than to the
Supreme Court because they are not used in the same ways. The Su-
preme Court allows amicus participation in the certiorari process.
This is a role of the amicus brief that is unique to the Supreme Court
as the courts of appeals do not make this decision regarding the ap-
peals they hear. A statistical analysis performed by Gregory Caldeira
and John Wright "demonstrates that the presence of amicus curiae
briefs filed prior to the decision on certiorari significantly and posi-
tively increases the chances of the justices' binding of a case over for
full treatment., 92 Amicus briefs prior to decisions on certiorari are
submitted relatively infrequently, but the total numbers are significant
considering how many petitions for certiorari are filed.93
This use of amicus briefs in decisions on certiorari indicates fun-
damentally different functions between the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals in our federal judicial system.9 The Supreme Court
is identifying important issues of federal law that it must decide. The
incidence of amicus briefs, their mere presence rather than content,
can be an indicator of how far-reaching and important an issue is.
95
Appeals courts do not do this. In most cases they are reviewing lower
court decisions for reversible error and the opinions of others aside
from the parties to the case should have limited value.
The en banc process, however, is a federal appellate practice that
mirrors to a certain extent the Supreme Court certiorari process. Ac-
cording to Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an
en banc hearing or rehearing is "not favored and ordinarily will not be
ordered unless (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or
maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance., 96  These cases are
chosen not because of the effects on the parties themselves generally,
but because of their effects on the legal system. Such cases are more
likely to mirror the types of cases the Supreme Court hears and a lar-
ger role of the amicus might be warranted.97  However, unlike the
92 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 61, at 1109.
93 See id. at 1116 (reporting that "at least one brief was submitted in 148 of the 1,906 peti-
tions" for writ of certiorari in the 1982 Supreme Court term, or 7.8%); see also Smith, supra
note 61, at 753 n.] 13 (finding an amicus brief filed in 6.3% of 318 cases examined).
94 The differing functions and an analysis of how that plays into the question of whether
appeals courts should restrict amicus participation is discussed below.
95 In their article on amicus participation in the University of Michigan cases, Alger and
Krislov discuss how amicus briefs are important in especially complex and socially important
cases. Alger & Krislov, supra note 58, at 526.
96 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
97 Sup. CT. R. 10 "indicate[s] the character of the reasons the Court considers." Gener-
ally, certiorari is more likely to be granted when there is conflict, need for supervision, or an
unsettled important question of federal law.
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Supreme Court where amici play a valuable and defined role in the
certiorari process, 98 there is no indication that the federal appellate
courts use amicus briefs to make the determination of when en banc
is appropriate in a comparable manner. Rule 29 makes no mention of
the en banc process.99 Additionally, amicus filings regarding deci-
sions whether or not to hear a case en banc are apparently rare.' ° En
banc hearings in general are very rare and make up less than one per-
cent of all court of appeals cases.101 While strong arguments can be
made that the appeals courts should be more lenient in granting
amicus participation in en banc hearings, and possibly even on the
decision whether or not to hear a case en banc, there are ways of lim-
iting amicus participation generally that give courts the flexibility to
recognize that a third-party viewpoint may be especially valuable in
these circumstances.
The identity of the amicus may shed some light on the value of a
brief as well. Kearney and Merrill found that certain institutional
amici, such as the ACLU and the AFL-CIO, are more successful in
swaying the Court than the average amicus. °2 They premised that
such institutions might have more experienced lawyers that could lead
to greater success.10 3 Although this research may be inconclusive, it
is worth considering who is filing amicus briefs in the appeals courts.
Federal government agencies, most often the Department of Justice,
and state attorneys general offices, were the most common amici dur-
ing 2002.104 Some other familiar institutions were also present.
ACLU offices made fifteen appearances, and the AARP made ten
appearances. 10 5 Other less prominent national advocacy groups and
interest groups made more limited appearances. Aside from this,
however, many of the amicus briefs were submitted by local groups
98 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 61, at 1116 (stating that 148 petitions for certiorari
involved an amicus filing); See also SUP. CT. R. 37.1 (providing filing requirements).
99 FED. R. APP. P. 29.
100 Amicus briefs at this stage are not non-existent however. See, e.g., Turtle Island Resto-
ration Network v. Evans, 299 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying en banc hearing but referenc-
ing an amicus submission).
101 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2002 - U.S. Courts of Appeals - Appeals
Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month
Period Ending September 30, 2002, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/s01sepO2.pdf (reporting 77 en banc terminations
out of 27,758 total terminations on the merits).
102 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 819.
10
3 Id. at 813-14 (discussing and citing KEVIN T. McGUmE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR
171-99 (1993)).
104 See infra Figure 4. These amicus briefs are filed of right under FED. R. APP. P. 29 and
thus are outside the scope of this Note. The courts do not have the power to restrict these briefs
under the current rule.
105 Id.
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who were one-time filers.10
6 It is difficult to draw conclusions from
this data, but it does paint a picture of a somewhat 
random amicus
practice. Amicus briefs are rarely filed, and 
when they are it is with-
out a clear pattern. There do not appear to 
be many groups with an
organized strategy of using amicus briefs to 
lobby the courts of ap-
peals. To the extent that less experienced 
filers achieve limited suc-
cess, as some research indicates, many of 
these groups might not be
very successful at influencing the courts. 
It is a possibility, although
unproven, that briefs by some of these local 
one-time filers may be of
limited value to the courts.
2002 Amicus Filers Number-o
Or anization or Category of Amicus Filer 
Filin s
Total Briefs from Amici Who Filed 3 or Less Times 
431
Federal Government Agencies 
81










Pacific Legal Foundation 
5
National Association of Criminal Defense La 
ers _5
Public Citizen Litigation Grou 
4
Paral zed Veterans of America 
4
Christian Legal Societ 
4
La ers Committee for Human Rights 
4
**This data is an approximation based on 2002 
Westlaw reported cases. Courts
are not consistent in naming amici so it is difficult to say 
for sure exactly who par-
ticipated in every case.
Figure 4.
The types of cases that federal appellate courts 
hear are generally
of the type where third party effects are 
limited, and thus, amicus
participation may be unnecessary. For example, 
all Supreme Court
opinions are published, an unquestionably 
wise choice considering
the novelty and importance of those decisions. 
The majority of courts
of appeals decisions are not published; only 
approximately 20% are
1061d.
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published. 10 7 This could represent the fact that the majority of ap-
peals court decisions do not, and are not intended to, have effects that
reach beyond the parties to the dispute. Many of these cases involve
an application of the law or a standard of review to a particular dis-
pute and serve little precedential value. The possibility of preceden-
tial value is outweighed by the possibility of inconsistent, confusing,
and insurmountable volumes of precedent that would exist were every
decision published. Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit made some of
these points in arguing for a presumption against publication, and
thus, against precedential value. He wrote, "[s]uch a rule would be an
overdue recognition that our primary function is dispute resolution
and our lawmaking function is only incidental to that primary func-
tion."' 08
Allowing basically unlimited amicus participation in the federal
appellate courts is inconsistent with this situation. If most cases have
no effects beyond the parties, there is no reason to allow such broad
amicus participation. It is only in a minority of cases that an inter-
ested amici should have a place. As premised above, it is likely that
the majority of appeals court decisions do not attract amicus partici-
pation for these very reasons. 09 Regardless, appellate procedure
should be aimed at protecting effective dispute resolution. The door
to amicus briefs should not be closed because they will be valuable
and appropriate in certain cases. However, since this is a minority of
cases, a broad reading of Rule 29 such that virtually any amicus has
access to any case is unnecessary and invites abuse of the device.
Amici, even interested ones, however, may provide information
that is helpful to the court in making a decision. But this traditional
view of the friend of the court providing useful information is likely
to be rare in this information age. Electronic databases provide ac-
cess to and means to navigate through unending legal materials, both
primary and secondary. Additionally, the internet provides access to
an abundance of information. Many common amici may have web-
sites with links to statistical studies and other information. In the
1
0 7 See Judicial Business, Types of Opinions or Orders, supra note 79.
108 John J. Gibbons, Maintaining Effective Procedures in the Federal Appellate Courts, in
THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1989).
109 It could be, however, that a dispute that should only have significance to the parties
winds up published because an amicus brief is submitted. Judge Gibbons wrote about Third
Circuit publication procedures: "an opinion which appears to have value only to the trial court
or to the parties is ordinarily not published." Id. at 26. Under such a practice, an amicus sub-
mission could theoretically create the appearance of wider value and result in a greater likeli-
hood of publication.
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past, courts may have been dependent on an amici to bring such in-
formation to its attention. Now, that is less likely to be the case.
Critics of a restrictive approach to amicus briefs in the courts of
appeals consider amicus briefs as useful tools. While they certainly
can be useful, it is difficult to identify important cases where this is
evident. In the Supreme Court, it is easy to identify many landmark
cases where an amicus brief was clearly influential, but this does not
speak to their value to the courts of appeals. 110 Regardless, efforts to
restrict amicus submissions are not aimed at the briefs which are truly
valuable to the court. An approach can be tailored to allow the filing
of briefs of potential value.
A final observation regarding value is that an overwhelming ma-
jority of appeals courts cases are decided without the aid of an amicus
brief. The 413 cases in 2002 where a brief was submitted was a mi-
nor portion of the total published cases."' This is in contrast to the
Supreme Court where the vast majority of cases are decided with the
aid of an amicus brief. Overall, amicus briefs play a much smaller
role at the appeals court level than at the Supreme Court level. De-
creasing amicus participation even more would have limited negative
effects on decision making. Although this tends to refute the idea that
amici have much value to the courts of appeals, it also may point out
the strongest argument for keeping the current open-door approach.
If amici file briefs in such small numbers and without much organiza-
tion, how big of a problem can they really be? However, this 'don't
fix it if it isn't broke' theory ignores the possibility of simple ways to
improve the system and protect litigants in individual cases. The next
section discusses how problems do exist despite the limited amicus
participation.
C. Negative Effects of Unrestriced Amicus Participation
Judge Posner, in National Organization for Women, expressed
concern that the overuse of amicus briefs results from attempts "to
inject interest group politics into the federal appeals process."'1 2 His
opinions reflect a desire to limit legislative characteristics in federal
appeals court cases.
"0See Munford, supra note 4, at 280-81 (citing some Supreme Court cases while making
the point that amicus briefs are useful to the courts of appeals).
M Judicial Business, Types of Opinions or Orders, supra note 79 (showing publication of
over 5,000 cases in this period).
1 2 Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2000) (asserting three
reasons nonparty amici curiae are a matter of judicial grace).
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The judicial process, in contrast [to the legislative process],
though "political" in a sense when judges are asked to decide
cases that conventional legal materials ... leave undeter-
mined, so that some mixture of judges' values, temperament,
ideology, experiences, and even emotions is likely to deter-
mine the outcome, is not democratic in the sense of basing
decision on the voting or campaign-financing power of con-
stituents and interest groups. An appeal should therefore not
resemble a congressional hearing. " 3
Justice Black took a somewhat different stance regarding amicus
participation when he wrote in 1954, "[m]ost of the cases before [the
Supreme] Court involve matters that affect far more than the immedi-
ate record parties. I think the public interest and judicial administra-
tion would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule
against amicus curiae briefs."' 14 While these statements may be the
result of personal opinions, they represent different views on judicial
decision making that could be, at least in part, attributed to the nature
of the courts the judges represent." 5 These differing approaches to
judging call into question the proper role of amicus briefs in each
court. In appeals courts, if more cases can be decided with conven-
tional legal materials, then outside opinions in the form of amicus
briefs are less likely to be of value. Arguably, they can thwart the
process by overloading the court with arguments that support only
one side.
An appellant in a federal court of appeals might feel that he or she
has a right to a fair process free from outside interference. Supreme
Court litigants might want the same right, but a claim to that right
would be less convincing. After all, no litigants have a right to argue
their case before the Supreme Court in the first place, so expectations
regarding outside participation in the form of amici would be less
justified. The initial appeal, however, is guaranteed and litigants
would have a stronger argument that limited outside interference in
their case is necessary to preserve a fair process under our adversarial
system. The idea that amicus participation may be more appropriate
in one court than another is not novel." 6 At the appeals court level,
"3 Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544-45 (7th Cir. 2003).
14 Krislov, supra note 29, at 715 (quoting Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme
Court, 346 U.S. 945, 947 (1954)).
1
5 See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 775-87 (discussing three models ofjudicial decision making and their implications regarding the impact of amicus briefs in the
Supreme Court).
116 Liberty Lincoln Mercury v. Ford Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 82 (D.N.J. 1993)(suggesting that the aid of amici in the trial court may be less useful than at the appellate level)
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especially when settled questions of law are at issue, amicus briefs
may not make sense.
The contours of our adversarial process are well-studied. One
commentator summed it up as follows: "[T]he adversary system as-
sumes that the most efficient and fair way of determining the truth is
by presenting the strongest possible case for each side of the contro-
versy before an impartial judge or jury."' 17 Although clearly a refer-
ence to fact-finding at trial level, the reasoning also applies to ap-
peals. The most efficient and fair way of determining legal issues on
appeal is to allow both parties to present their case by submitting ap-
pellate briefs of equal length. An amicus brief on one side may mean
that that side has an advantage in making a case. This could skew the
adversarial process. Even if the courts are able to disregard the addi-
tional brief for one side, the perceptions of inequality alone could be
damaging. This is something with which courts are, and should be,
concerned.1 18 In 1962, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The Court's au-
thority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction." '119 Al-
though this concern may seem unrealistic, it is significant in an era
where the cost of litigation and the time it takes to have a day in court
are so high. Confidence in the courts may already be decreasing, so
perceptions of inequality caused by the use of amici could be espe-
cially damaging.
Perceptions, however, are not the only concern. Fears regarding
unfair results and a tilting of the adversarial balance might be war-
ranted. Kearney and Merrill found that, in the Supreme Court, "small
disparities of amicus support (one or two briefs to none) may be asso-
ciated with increased success for the supported party.' ' 20 This would
not be considered a problem at the Supreme Court level because the
concern is more about the far-reaching policy implications of a deci-
sion than it is for fairness to the individual litigants. Additionally, so
many amicus briefs are submitted for Supreme Court cases that "[in
most cases the amicus briefs are symmetrically distributed betweenthe parties.,,12  These cases draw so much attention that amici often
come out in force on both sides of an issue.
(quoting Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D.N.J. 1985)).
117 MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975).
11 See Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2002) (dis-
cussing viewpoint discrimination concerns).
19 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120 Keamey & Merrill, supra note 48, at 829.
121 Id.
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This is not the case in the courts of appeals. Of the cases surveyed
for 2002, only one amicus brief was present in 291 of the 413 cases,
or 70%.22 In the remaining cases, two or more briefs were present
which often supported only one side. In all of these cases, the party
supported by an amicus brief may have gained an advantage.
Whether or not these amicus briefs give an advantage to the supported
party is not clear. Amici may be less effective at swaying appeals
court judges deciding more straightforward legal questions. Addi-
tionally, the undesirably repetitive amicus briefs would presumably
not be very effective. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the side
with the support of an amicus has an advantage.
The cost of litigation is already high and even higher when an
amicus brief is submitted. A litigant may be unable to respond to an
amicus brief for the opposing side by soliciting one of his or her own
because of cost concerns. The cost of filing an amicus brief has been
estimated to range from $10,000 to $15,000, and often more.123 Even
if a party is not going to attempt to solicit an amicus brief to support
his or her side, he or she may feel compelled to reply to the opposing
amicus brief which will also be an added expense. 124 Given the
sparse amicus participation in the appeals courts and at least the per-
ception, if not the reality, that a supporting amicus provides an advan-
tage, the public may come to believe that favorable adjudications can
be bought by soliciting a supporting amicus.
It is often not the case that interested third parties independently
come into the case and happen to support one party. While it is diffi-
cult to say exactly how often it occurs, it is clear that parties to a case
participate in amicus solicitation, preparation, and financing. Judges
have expressed dislike of this practice, and rules, including Supreme
Court Rule 37, have adopted disclosure requirements to keep an eye
on these practices. 125 Secondary legal materials also provide evidence
of the prevalence of these practices. There are several practice guides
advising on methods and benefits of party use of amici. 126 The fact
1
22 See supra Figure 1.
1
23 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 57, at 800.
124 See FED. R. ApP. P. 29(e) (indicating that a party may reply to an amicus brief support-
ing the opposing side).
125See Glassroth v. Moore, 347, F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2003) ("we suspect that amicus
briefs are often used as a means of evading the page limitations on a party's brief"); Voices for
Choices v. 111. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (remarking that amicus briefs are
often solicited by parties). See also SUP. CT. R. 37(6) (disclosure requirements).
126See, e.g., John J. Ursu, Thomas A. Boardman, & David F. Herr, Amicus Curiae, in 4
SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 66.24 (Robert L. Haig
ed., West Group 2000) (discussing strategy for solicitation of amici and noting "counsel can be
uniquely valuable in coordinating the process of identifying likely amici and motivating organi-
zations to participate as amicus"); David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice: New Rules for Old
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that parties are intentionally using amici in an attempt to gain an ad-
vantage may exacerbate perceptions of inequity.
In his criticism of a restrictive policy towards amicus briefs in
Neonatology Associates, Judge Alito expressed concern about "the
perception of viewpoint discrimination" and the message that our
courts are not open. 127 A more damaging perception, however, would
be that the party with deeper pockets, or the party who has more in-
terest groups in its corner, could gain an advantage in the court.
That is not to say that the party with the least money or experience
in litigation will always be harmed under the current system. For
example, it may seem just to allow an amicus to support an employee
challenging a corporation with presumably more resources and legal
sophistication. 128 But the reforms suggested by Justice Posner would
look for cases where a party is inadequately represented. 129 There is
no reason why a court could not look to relative adequacy of repre-
sentation in considering this factor.
Finally, in discussing possible inequitable or harmful effects re-
sulting from amicus participation, it is worth reiterating that if a court
has before it a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief, at least
one party has refused to consent to its filing.' 30 In granting a motion
for leave to file an amicus brief, the court is going against the wishes
of at least one party in opening the case to third party participation.
Clearly the wishes of a party are not dispositive. There are many
situations in which the court will allow additional parties to enter liti-
gation (e.g., intervention), and existing parties may have no say in
that. Also, it is a reality that money can be a powerful tool in litiga-
tion. Just consider the use of expensive expert witnesses for example.
However, in a judicial system in which "respect for the
individual ... is the lifeblood of the law,"' 13 1 it is necessary to look at
Friends, in 25 LITIGATION 25, 29 (1999) (discussing strategy in response to new participation
rules and suggesting that parties "[l]ine up amicus support early. Assuming that amicus support
is desired, a good approach is to find similarly situated entities at the earliest possible stage of
the case."); TIGAR & TIGAR, supra note 14, at 181 ("[an advocate whose case involves an issue
of great consequence should seriously consider inviting an amicus brief from organizations and
individuals that support his or her position.").
127 Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002).
128 See, e.g., Adams v. Bowater, Inc., 313 F.3d 611 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding AARP partici-
pation as amicus curiae in a suit by employees challenging a corporations amendments to a
pension plan as a violation of ERISA).
'29 Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2003) (refusing to
permit state legislative leaders and telecommunications workers' union leave to file amicus
curiae briefs that would be repetitive of the briefs already filed by adequately represented par-
ties).
130 FED. R. APP. P. 29(a).
131 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to the
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the justification for infringing on a party's rights and raising costs and
the possible effects of such actions. Since there is very little value in
allowing broad systematic amicus participation in federal appeals
court, efforts to restrict participation are appropriate.
HI. LIMITING PARTICIPATION: REFORMING RULE 29 AND
PUBLICATION
This section discusses the possibility of a codified factored ap-
proach to decisions on whether to allow an amicus and rejects such an
approach. Then it suggests reforms to Rule 29 regarding financing
and preparation. It also advocates publication as a way to deter un-
wanted filings.
A. A Factor Approach to Amicus Participation
Any method of restricting amicus participation that actually in-
creases the workload on the courts of appeals is not likely to be popu-
lar in the already overburdened system. The approach advocated by
Judge Posner would look at whether (1) a party is inadequately repre-
sented, or (2) the potential amicus has a direct interest in another case
that may be materially affected by a decision in this case, or (3) the
potential amicus has a unique perspective and specific information
that can aid the court.132 It has been argued that an application of this
requirement on motions to file amicus briefs could actually increase
the workload of the court. 133 This logic is easy to follow. Under the
current rule, a motion for leave to file an amicus brief must be at-
tached to a copy of the proposed brief.'34 If the court will be reading
the brief to decide whether to allow it, it is hard to see how this will
relieve the court of any burden. Additionally, the court will also be
considering arguments regarding inadequate representation, material
interests, and unique perspectives.
However, the policy of restricting amicus participation is justified
not necessarily by caseload concerns, but also as an effort to provide
an equitable forum and reduce interest group influence. Therefore, a
factored approach that does not reduce the burden of amicus briefs
rights of a criminal defendant).
132 Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2000).
133 Neonatology Assocs. v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002) ("a restrictive
practice regarding motions for leave to file seems to be an unpromising strategy for lightening a
court's workload. For one thing, the time required for skeptical scrutiny of proposed amicus
briefs may be equal, if not exceed, the time that would have been needed to study the briefs at
the merits stage if leave had been granted.").
134 FED. R. App. P. 29(b).
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might still be desirable.1 35 It would accomplish the important end of
preventing certain undesirable amici from participation. Perhaps even
the adoption of a restrictive approach, although initially time consum-
ing, might deter potential amici from moving to file a brief and then,
over time, result in a decreased burden on the courts.
If the approach advocated by Judge Posner resulted in a significant
increase in workload, however, it is unlikely it would be embraced by
already heavily burdened courts, regardless of possible benefits down
the road. While there is support for the position that amicus participa-
tion should be curbed in the lower courts, 136 there is no indication that
it is of such concern that courts would take on additional workload.
Admittedly, the case for restriction made in this Note is not over-
whelming or urgent. Rather, restricting amicus participation would
be more of a fine tuning of the system.
The question, therefore, is whether Judge Posner's approach could
be applied without resulting in additional workload. Two of the three
situations in which the court would likely grant amicus participation
do not appear to pose much of a problem. A court should be able to
determine whether a party in the case is adequately represented with-
out much work, and this is something a court should be doing any-
way. A court should also be able to look at a proposed brief and de-
cide whether there is information that will be of assistance to it. The
last situation, when a direct interest in another case may be materially
affected by a decision in the current case, is potentially more trouble-
some.
This last situation is not all that different from another one in
which a third party can participate in a case, intervention. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), one can intervene "when
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or im-
pede the applicant's ability to protect that interest.' '137 Although dif-
ferent from the requirement suggested by Judge Posner, certain simi-
135 Some states have adopted approaches using factors as well and have considered
whether the litigation is of a general type where amicus participation would be more likely to be
appropriate. See New York State Senator Kruger v. Bloomberg, 768 N.Y.S.2d 76, 83 (N.Y.
Sup. 2003) (considering as a factor "whether the case concerns questions of important public
interest"); State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63
S.W.3d 734, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (considering, among other things, "the nature of the
litigation and the issues presented").
136 See sources cited supra note 21 (discussing judicial support for the restrictive approach
advocated by Judge Posner).
137 FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2).
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lar determinations would have to be made.' 38  A court deciding
whether to allow an amicus brief would have to determine exactly
what type of interest is necessary and to what degree of certainty and
severity it might be affected. These are questions that, in the context
of Rule 24 intervention, have resulted in a great deal of litigation.
There are several A.L.R. annotations collecting cases solely on these
issues. 139 Although amicus participation at the appeals court level is
not likely to be litigated to such a degree, formalization of Judge Pos-
ner's approach would have the potential to lead to this type of litiga-
tion.* It is hard to imagine that the federal appellate judiciary would
risk this to deal with problems resulting from amicus participation
that, despite the concerns raised here, are probably not a high priority
issue for most.
B. Changes to Rule 29: Barring Party Financing and Preparation
There is a simpler solution available that could reduce the use of
amici briefs that merely extend a party's argument and avoid page
limitations. It could also reduce perceptions of inequality. The Su-
preme Court's Rule 37(6) requires disclosures regarding whether
counsel for a party played any role in authoring the brief as well as
disclosures as to any person or entity, other than the amicus curiae,
who made financial contributions for the preparation and submission
of the brief. 4° At least one state requires similar disclosures in its
appellate courts. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require
amicus briefs to identify who the brief supports and who paid for the
brief.141 That rule, as pointed out by one Comment, does not prevent
ghost writing because a party can still prepare the brief, interests of
the amici might not be disclosed, and indirect monetary contributions
go undisclosed. 142
138 See Sierra Club, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the legal in-
terest necessary for intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and stating that
a mere political interest may not even justify amicus participation).
139 See, e.g., Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, General Considerations in Determining
What Constitutes Impairment of Proposed Intervener's Interest to Support Intervention As
Matter of Right under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 A.L.R. FED. 632
(1985); Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, What Is "Interest" Relating to Property or Trans-
action Which Is Subject of Action Sufficient to Satisfy That Requirement for Intervention As
Matter of Right under Rule 24(a)(2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 73 A.L.R. FED. 448
(1985); Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Construction of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 24(a)(2),
As Amended in 1966, Insofar As Dealing with Prerequisites of Intervention As a Matter of
Right, 5 A.L.R. FED. 518 (1970).140 SuP. CT. R. 37(6).
141 TEx. R. APP. P. 11, available at www.courts.state.tx.uslpublicinfoltraplrulel l.htm.
142 Sorenson, supra note 2, at 1251-54 (arguing that, in order to remain viable, amicus
practice must be ethical, and proposing that courts adopt further disclosure requirements to
prevent unethical amicus practices).
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The federal appellate rules do require a statement of the identity of
the amicus curiae and the source of its authority to file, but do not
mention participation in authorship or monetary contribution. 143 Be-
cause a party might participate in the preparation and filing of an
amicus brief in many ways, the appellate rules should be changed to
prevent parties to the case from playing any part in preparation or
financing of an amicus brief. 144 A ban on this type of activity is fea-
sible in the appeals court because amicus briefs are not entrenched in
that system yet. They are still relatively rare. And yet this sparse
usage, combined with loose rules regarding participation, creates an
environment where one party can, by financing or soliciting a sham
amicus, gain an unfair advantage.
The courts would not be hurt by this approach. They still have the
ability to appoint an amicus sua sponte when in need of information
or desiring to protect an inadequately represented party. Outside par-
ties could still appear as amicus if they had a direct interest in the
case. In fact, it would be a much clearer indication of true interest if
such a party appeared of its own volition and on its own dollar. Par-
ties to the case would be the only ones truly hindered by such a rule,
but they already have the right to be heard by the court and should not
need to resort to additional help except in limited circumstances as
discussed above.
145
C. Publication as a Deterrent
For the amicus briefs which are independently financed and pro-
duced, the courts could look to the criteria applied in the Seventh Cir-
cuit, or they could announce a different approach. With an eye to-
wards reduction of unhelpful and unfair briefs, individual courts can
and should work out the parameters of appropriate amicus submis-
sions. However, whatever approach is taken will be most effective at
reducing unhelpful filings if opinions are published more frequently.
Such publications are rare now. 14 6 Rule 29 requires that a motion for
143 FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(3).
144 See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 918-19 (11 th Cir. 2003) (noting that attor-
ney records indicated "she spent.. .time enlisting various organizations to appear as amici;
suggesting potential signatories for the briefs; working on, supervising, and reviewing the
amicus briefs; and seeing that they were mailed on time").
145 Ethical duties of lawyers should be adequate to enforce this rule and therefore, judicial
oversight of such a rule should, hopefully, be minimal. See generally Sorenson, supra note 2, at
1249-63 (discussing interrelations of ethical rules and amicus practice).
146 Denying motions to file amicus briefs is rare, but not as rare as publication of a written
explanation explaining rationale. When a denial is not published, potential amici will not be
aware of it, and it will not effect their practices unless it is a rare high profile case with news
coverage. See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Judges Cast Skeptical Eyes on Southern Co. Race Suit,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Jan. 28, 2004, available at
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leave to file as amicus state relevancy and desirability, but unless the
courts explain what this means these criteria serve no purpose in de-
terring filings. 47 Potential amici in the Seventh Circuit can look to a
line of decisions explaining when a brief will not be accepted and see
the types of situations when it would be futile to prepare and move to
file a brief. Amici can then make decisions accordingly. In combina-
tion with Rule 29's requirement that the proposed brief accompany
the motion for leave to file, a powerful deterrent situation is cre-
ated. 148 Questionable amici will not spend the time and thousands of
dollars preparing a brief with knowledge that it might not even make
it before the court.' 49 On the other hand, in a situation where almost
all briefs are accepted and rejections go unnoticed, potential amici
will not be deterred by this risk. The Seventh Circuit experience
seems to lend support to this hypothesis. In recent years, the number
of cases with amicus participation in the Seventh Circuit has dipped
significantly below the average number of cases with amicus partici-
pation for a circuit court.' 50 In 2002, only one circuit, the Eighth, had
fewer cases with amicus participation than the Seventh Circuit. 51
This trend appears to support the proposition that the Ryan decision in
1997, the adoption of changes to Rule 29 in 1998, and the National
Organization of Women decision in 2000 have deterred amicus fil-
ings. 5
2
http:lwww.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=1075219810167 (noting the rare denial of amicus re-
quests by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
147 FED. R. APP. P. 29(b)(l)-(2).
148 FED. R. App. P. 29(b).
149 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 57, at 800 (noting that the cost of a brief may exceed
$10,000 to $15,000).
'50See infra Figure 5.
'51 See supra Figure 2. This is despite the fact that the Seventh Circuit publishes more
opinions than the average per circuit. In the 12 month period ending September 30, 2002, the
Seventh Circuit published 613 opinions while the average number of published opinions per
circuit was 450. See Judicial Business, Types of Opinions or Orders, supra note 79.
152 See infra Figure 5. This trend is not conclusive as many other factors not controlled
could contribute to it. Additionally, the numbers do not indicate whether publication of denials
deters submissions or submissions are low because of frequent denials by the court.
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Figure 5
Regardless of how a court enunciates its criteria for amicus par-
ticipation, it can accomplish a lot by publishing whatever rationale it
has for denying motions for leave to file. The judicial resources nec-
essary to accomplish this should be minimal. The Seventh Circuit,
for example, published only three opinions since 1997, all relatively
short and somewhat repetitive, and made its stance very clear. The
effects in reduced filings would far outweigh this use of resources.
153
CONCLUSION
"'The fundamental principle underlying legal procedure,' a court
has observed, 'is that parties to a controversy shall have the right to
litigate the same, free from the interference of strangers. ' ' 154  Al-
though such thinking has clearly not guided the historical judicial
acquiescence to broad amicus participation, the specific characteris-
tics of the federal appellate courts and of current amicus practice in
those courts requires rethinking this practice. Amici are now inter-
153 The Seventh Circuit opinions are fairly short and repeat the same principles, but they
get the point across. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003),
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. CFrC, 125 F.3d 1062
(7th Cir. 1997).
154 Krislov, supra note 29, at 696 (quoting Consol. Liquor Corp. v. Scotello & Nizzi, 155
P. 1089, 1092 (N.M. 1916)).
[Vol. 55:3
2005] AMICI CURIAE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 699
ested participants rather than friends of the courts. At the federal ap-
peals level, there is limited value in this role and potentially damaging
effects. The system should be set up so that inappropriate submis-
sions are rejected and deterred.
There are certainly many very complex appeals court cases where
an amicus brief on one side or the other will be just and helpful.
Amicus briefs may be of great value in a particular case. Amicus
participation may be the only option for a third party to protect a sig-
nificant interest, or it may bring material information to the courts
attention that otherwise would have gone unnoticed. Fairness con-
cerns are minimal in certain cases that already have multiple parties
spending large amounts of money. Outside interests and financial
strength play an inevitable role in our adversarial judicial system.
However, rules are necessary to promote usage when valuable and to
deter abuse.
Amicus participation is an addition to the heavy caseload of the
federal courts of appeals. It is not an overwhelming burden, but it is
not insignificant. While an amicus may be valuable in certain cases,
these cases are rare. Most federal appeals apply settled standards of
review to the facts before them and there will be limited third party
effects. Courts rarely cite amici and do not decide their docket based
on possible third party effects of a decision. Finally, there are harm-
ful effects that result, including perceptions of an inequitable process
and the real possibility of unfair results, increased costs of litigation,
and abuse of amicus practice by parties. A broad policy of unchecked
amicus participation in the federal courts of appeals is inappropriate
for these reasons.
While the burden imposed by amicus participation is not insur-
mountable and the harmful effects will not result in grave injustices or
the downfall of our legal system, these are concerns that should be
addressed. A rule preventing parties from financing or participating
in preparation of amicus briefs will reduce the burden and prevent a
particularly harmful type of amicus participation. Further disclosure
requirements will provide the court with a context to aid in the deci-
sion whether participation is appropriate. Finally, publication of
opinions with rationale for denying participation, in combination with
the existing requirement of filing the brief along with the motion for
leave to file it, will create a powerful deterrent against potential amici
who do not have a legitimate reason to be heard. An open door policy
towards amicus submissions is based on the assumptions that amicus
briefs are generally helpful and any other approach would not be
worth the trouble. This proposal rejects these assumptions. It recog-
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nizes the current approach is inconsistent with actual amicus practice
and proposes rules in line with real usages of amicus curiae.
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